"The Collapse of Sensemaking"
Part II

By Rich Jennings

Karl Weick (Cornell University, 1993) described minimal organizations such as a team or small management groups as susceptible to a sudden loss of meaning and direction when facing events that are fundamental surprises. Those involved in such an event suddenly and deeply feel their universe is no longer orderly or rational as both their sense of what is occurring and their means to rebuild that sense collapse together. Weick describes this as the “…opposite of deju vu: I’ve never been here before, I have no idea where I am, and I have no idea who can help me.”

Learning From Tragedy
Part I described Weick’s use of the August, 1949 tragedy claiming the lives of thirteen members of a forest firefighting crew in a blaze at Mann Gulch, Montana. From this story of a young, inexperienced crew, an experienced leader with poor communication skills, a fragmented chain of command, and an explosive fire feeding on rugged, unforgiving terrain, Weick leads us in seeking answers to the questions, “Why do organizations unravel?” and “How can they be made more resilient?”

These questions are timely as organizations increasingly form ad hoc teams to address a particular situation in which the stakes are frequently high and foul-ups can have serious consequences. Weick believes by understanding what happened at Mann Gulch, we might find valuable lessons in conceptualizing and coping with contemporary teams.

The Collapse of Sensemaking
Weick perceives sensemaking as an attempt to define our reality as an ongoing accomplishment coming from our individual efforts at creating order by relying on past experiences to give form and meaning (sense) to what is occurring now. Furthermore, we are very reluctant to abandon the patterns which give meaning to our reality even when our senses tell us otherwise. The firefighters at Mann Gulch expected a small, easily contained fire persisted in that belief until it was too late to change. Their old labels from past experiences were outstripped and they could not “make sense” of this new reality. Positive illusions can kill people.

As the fire crew’s ability to make sense of their reality collapsed, so did their group structure. This structure was tenuous from the beginning with a marginally defined command structure below the foreman Wagner Dodge. As the danger of their situation increased amidst the smoke and advancing fire line, this structure disintegrated. Moreover, an unsettling challenge to their role structure occurred as Dodge ordered the retreating crew to discard their tools and run. Retreating from the fire and ordered to toss away the “emblems” of their trade they were no longer a fire crew but a group of panicked refugees left on their own at the worst possible moment. Dodge’s final command to jump into an escape fire was not seen as legitimate but as the ravings of someone “gone nuts” and was ignored.

Recipe for Disaster
The recipe for the disorganization at Mann Gulch culminating in a tragic disaster is not that uncommon in everyday life. For Weick, this recipe reads: thrust people into unfamiliar roles, leave some key roles unfilled, make the task ambiguous, discredit the group’s structure and make all of these changes within a context in which small events can combine into something very unpleasant.

From Vulnerability to Resilience
Seeking to make minimal organizations more resistant to disintegration during a crisis event, Weick identifies four sources of resilience.

• Improvisation & Creativity: Not everything can be done “by the book.” To counter the chaotic conditions of crisis, creativity and improvisation can lead a management team to figure out what they already know and apply that knowledge to new insights for solutions.
• Virtual Role Systems: To often team members segregate roles (responsibilities) of each member. Wieck recommends the opposite in which each member envisions all roles within the team. Often called group synergy, each member actively contributes to the total solution not to an insulated portion of the problem.
• The Attitude of Wisdom: In a fluid world, wise people know they do not fully understand what is happening right now because they have never seen precisely this event before. To adapt in fluid situations, organizations need curiosity, openness, and complex sensing and must shun a closed-minded, stay-the-course attitude.
• Respectful Interaction: Respect the reports of others; Honestly report your own observations; Respect your own perceptions and beliefs seeing to integrate them with the reports of others without deprecating them or yourself.

The keystone to resilience however remains communication. Even minimal communication is crucial for nonstop talk, both vocal and nonverbal, is a critical source of coordination and ideas during crisis management. A lack of communication, especially when coupled to the ad hoc group heightens the vulnerability for stress, disruption and failure.

Even though Weick’s study is several years old, the core of his analysis is sound. It remains a benchmark against which we can measure our teams and committees to insure their resiliency in the face of inconceivable events.

Sources
Davidson, Mark. “Leading Through ’The Gates of Hell’”: Learning from a Fire in Mann Gulch.” Wharton Leadership Digest. 27 Aug. 2004.
http://leadership.wharton.upenn.edu/digest/08%2D01.shtml.

For excellent photos of the Mann Gulch area, see:
http://leadership.wharton.upenn.edu/l_change/Fire.shtml
Weick, Karl E. “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster.”
Administrative Science Quarterly December 1993 v38 n4: 628.
Oct. 19, 2006.

 

"The Collapse of Sensemaking"
Part I

By Rich Jennings

Perhaps you’ve seen the scenario. A customer tries to return a product to a store’s service desk. Something is wrong and an argument between the customer and the clerk ensues. Both feel the other is being unreasonable and cannot comprehend the “simplicity” of the store’s return policy or the customer’s return request. A customer service manager is
called to assist. Voices are ratcheted up a notch. A store director is called. Emotions are strained as threats and counter threats fly. Communication has ceased. In frustration and anger, the customer storms out of the store vowing never to return; the management staff breathes a sigh of relief and prepares to assist the next customer who is presumed to be
more reasonable.

Perhaps you’ve seen a project team disintegrate. All is moving on schedule when, unexpectedly, a problem is encountered. Possibly it is a new requirement from management or the customer, or some unforeseen obstacle. In any event, plans are upset and the schedule wrecked. As the team becomes myopic, focused only on this problem, their sense of what is occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse together.
On a larger scale, Katrina was only a hurricane until the levees broke; then it quickly became a catastrophe. Unfortunately, local, state, and federal administrators took several days to realize this shift and react.

The Unsuspected Vulnerability of Minimal Organizations Specifically exploring the unsuspected vulnerability placed on minimal organizations, such as a team or a small business, Karl Weick (Cornell University, 1993) found these organizations susceptible to a sudden loss of meaning and direction when facing events that are fundamental surprises or inconceivable or incomprehensible events. In such an episode, people suddenly and deeply feel their universe is no longer orderly or rational.

The impact of such an event is further heightened for those involved as both their sense of what is occurring and their means to rebuild that sense collapse together. Weick describes this as the “…opposite of deju vu: I’ve never been here before, I have no idea where I am, and I have no idea who can help me.”

Having read Young Men and Fire by Norman Maclean (A River Runs Through It), which describes the tragic loss of 13 smokejumpers during a 1949 forest fire at Mann Gulch, Montana, Weick uses this incident to analyze the interactive disintegration of role structure and sensemaking within small groups. This article will review the tragedy to provide a
context for a subsequent analysis..

Mann Gulch: 5 August, 1949 Late the previous afternoon, a lightning strike had touched off a fire in the heavily timbered area known as Mann Gulch. At mid-afternoon on the 5th, a contingent of 14 smokejumpers and their crew chief Wagner Dodge parachuted into the area joining the local forestry ranger Jim Harrison. The forestry service was in its infancy at time leaning the best techniques to combat forest fires in rugged terrain. The ad hoc crew consisted of forestry students and “professional adventurers” many of whom were ex-military. They were trained in fire fighting, but had not trained as a unit. Their crew chief was the most experienced. Going in, they assumed this to be a “10:00 fire”; a routine event that would be contained and extinguished by 10:00 the next day. They did not anticipate the 97-degree temperature and high winds spawning a firestorm on the ridge opposite their landing zone progressively cutting them off from their avenue of escape and placing them in grave danger. Ignoring the loss of their radio in the jump, they leisurely ate dinner and did not move out until 5:00 pm to begin surrounding the fire. Worried that the thick forest near the landing zone could be a death trap, Dodge directed his crew to head towards the nearby Missouri River. Leading the strung out line of crew Dodge suddenly saw the fire had already crossed the gulch and was only 200 yards ahead moving toward them: a 30 foot wall of flame moving at 610 feet per minute. At this point the others had not yet seen their imminent danger Dodge ordered the crew to immediately begin angling to their left up a 76 percent slope toward the safety of the ridgeline but away from the perceived safety of the River. Impeded by the thick grass, the fire, now apparent to all, was gaining on them. Dodge ordered them to drop their tools to make better time, but it was obvious they would not win this race.

To the crew’s astonishment, Dodge lit a fire in front of them and ordered the crew to lie down in the area it had burned. . In the sensory confusion of wind, flames, and exploding trees, the crew had outstripped their past experience and had lost the ability to make sense of their surroundings. In this circumstance, Dodge’s last-ditch measure made no sense – the actions of one “gone nuts.” Two men evaded the fire escaping through a rock crevice to a rocky ledge. Dodge survived in the burned area of his backfire. The remaining thirteen died. By 5:56 pm, it was over. Five days later, 450 men had the 4,500-acre Mann Gulch fire under control.

In the next issue, we will how Weick uses this incident to answer the questions, “Why do organizations unravel?” and “How can they be made more resilient?”

Sources
Davidson, Mark. “Leading through’The Gates of Hell’”: Learning from a Fire in Mann Gulch.” Wharton Leadership
http://leadership.wharton.upenn.edu/digest/08%2D01.shtml .

For excellent photos of the Mann Gulch area, see:
http://leadership.wharton.upenn.edu/l_change/Fire.shtml
Weick, Karl E. “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster.” Administrative Science Quarterly December 1993 v38 n4: 628. Oct. 19, 2006.